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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union tends to have little 
leverage to bring about reforms of Member 
States’ economies. Numerous ideas have 
been put forward to address this issue. One 
of the most prominent suggestions is to let 
Member States sign a contract with the EU 
on their upcoming structural reforms. Such 
structural reform contracts were first 
proposed by European Council President 
Herman Van Rompuy, after which the idea 
gained traction in various EU institutions. 
The European Commission proposed its 
own kind of structural reform contracts, 
while the European Council asked its 
President to examine the feasibility and 
modalities of the contracts by June 2013 
(European Commission, 2012a; European 
Council, 2012). 
The idea of structural reform contracts has a 
sound basis. But when considering such 
contracts, the EU has failed so far to take 
The idea of introducing contracts 
between Member States and the 
EU on structural reforms has its 
merits, it also has several 
disadvantages. Most notably, the 
contracts risk rendering European 
economic governance even more 
complex and cumbersome. It is 
therefore sensible to first try to 
integrate the structural reform 
contracts into one of the foreseen 
economic governance instruments. 
This Policy Brief argues that 
macroeconomic conditionality can 
serve this purpose. With some 
minor reforms, it could even 
become a full-fledged substitute for 
structural reform contracts – 
without suffering some of latter’s 
disadvantages. 
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into account one of its own basic rules for 
better regulation: the need to take stock of 
what is already in place. A key problem of 
structural reform contracts is precisely that 
they would add yet another layer to the 
already complex and burdensome European 
economic governance framework. 
The EU should hence examine whether 
elements of the foreseen economic 
governance framework could not provide a 
worthy substitute for new structural reform 
contracts. This Policy Brief argues that 
macroeconomic conditionality, one of the 
foreseen economic governance instruments, 
can indeed play this role. 
STRUCTURAL REFORM CONTRACTS  
The European Council President proposed a 
range of measures to achieve a “genuine” 
Economic and Monetary Union. Many of 
them are seen as measures that would be 
implemented in a few years’ time at the 
earliest. His proposal for structural reform 
contracts, however, constitutes one of the 
few measures that could be put into practice 
rather swiftly. 
The concept 
The concept of structural reform contracts 
has been given a variety of names: the 
Commission refers to it as a “convergence and 
competiveness instrument”, the European Council 
President calls it “arrangements of a contractual 
nature”, while the European Council itself 
describes it as “contracts for competiveness and 
growth”. Whichever term is used, the goal of 
the instruments is self-evident, namely to give 
the EU a more powerful instrument to push 
forward structural reforms in the Member 
States. 
According to the proposals, some (or 
perhaps all) eurozone countries would be 
invited to sign a contract with the EU. For 
eurozone countries facing particular 
difficulties, signing such a contract could 
even be made mandatory.1 Each contract 
would detail the structural reforms that a 
specific Member State commits to undertake 
in the coming years, including the timeline 
for these reforms. The structural reforms 
would, inter alia, aim to liberalise the labour 
market and remove restrictions to the 
provision of goods and services in the 
country. The contracts would be drawn up by 
the EU and the Member State, perhaps in 
collaboration with the national and European 
parliaments.  
The structural reform contracts are to be 
based on the country-specific recommenda-
tions that are made by the EU at the end of 
the European Semester. It thus seems natural 
that these contracts would be drafted in the 
second half of the calendar year, i.e. after the 
country-specific recommendations have been 
issued. 
In order to become a balanced instrument, 
the structural reform contracts would include 
a financial incentive for certain countries that 
meet their contractual commitments. This 
financial incentive, or “carrot”, is to offer a 
compensation for the short-term costs 
attached to the reforms. To ensure that it is 
well-targeted, the financial incentive would 
only be available for those structural reforms 
that are deemed the most needed. The 
incentive would be financed by a specific 
budget that is still to be created (Vanden 
Bosch, 2013). 
In a nutshell, the structural reform contracts 
aim to combine more European control over 
national reforms with more European 
solidarity. The structural reform contracts 
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could indeed offer an instrument to push 
forward key reforms in the Member States.  
The problems attached 
Despite the appealing elements of the 
structural reform contracts, they also have 
serious disadvantages. Three problems seem 
to be of particular importance. 
First and foremost, the structural reform 
contracts would yet again add a layer to the 
European economic governance framework. 
European and national administrations 
already have a multitude of planning and 
reporting requirements during the European 
Semester and the remainder of the year. The 
complexity does not stop there. Economic 
governance becomes even more demanding 
when certain problems are detected in a 
Member State, by means of the Excessive 
Deficit and Excessive Imbalance Procedures, 
as well as macroeconomic conditionality. 
Practitioners rightly perceive the economic 
governance process as complex and 
cumbersome. The EU seems pretty far away 
from applying the design motto “keep it 
simple”. Despite its good intentions, the 
proposal to add an additional governance 
layer in the form of structural reform 
contracts therefore risks actually having an 
adverse effect on the effectiveness of 
European economic governance. 
The need for an additional budget to make 
the contracts work constitutes a second 
disadvantage. The new budget should have a 
certain size for it to play a role of importance. 
It would, as a consequence, worsen the 
national budget deficits of countries that are 
net contributors to the new budget. Even if 
the budget would be limited to € 10bn per 
annum, it would still add about 0.1% of GDP 
to the budget deficit of countries that 
contribute to the fund without receiving 
substantial funding in return.2 While 0.1% of 
GDP might seem insignificant to some, it is 
highly questionable whether Member States 
are willing to accept any such deterioration of 
their already dire public finances. 
A final disadvantage of the envisaged 
contracts is the fact that they would require 
considerable legislative and political energy 
before becoming operational. The efforts 
that would be needed would come in 
addition to the already massive workload of 
the European institutions and the Member 
States before the end of the European 
legislative period mid-2014. It seems that the 
structural reform contracts would thus have 
to gain priority over other urgent legislative 
initiatives (notably the Banking Union) or, 
alternatively, that an agreement on these 
contracts would only be reached once they 
have lost their short-term purpose. 
MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY 
AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
Given the problems attached to introducing 
entirely new structural reform contracts, it 
seems much more sensible to examine 
whether the idea could be integrated into the 
foreseen economic governance framework. 
For this purpose, macroeconomic 
conditionality would provide a most suitable 
instrument. 
From 2014 onwards, macroeconomic 
conditionality is set to become a powerful 
instrument in economic governance. It is a 
rather innovative –and controversial3– 
instrument, as it links European cohesion 
policy funding to respect for the rules of 
economic governance. Macroeconomic 
conditionality can be called upon whenever a 
Member State is not in line with the rules or 
recommendations of the European economic 
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governance framework. This includes a 
Member State insufficiently considering 
country-specific recommendations on 
structural reforms.4 In such instances, the 
Commission can ask the Member State to 
revise its “Partnership Contract” with the EU 
(in which it sets out its commitments to 
ensure the proper and effective use of 
cohesion policy funding).5 
A detailed procedure has been foreseen to 
apply macroeconomic conditionality. When 
the procedure is opened, a Member State is 
to propose amendments to its Partnership 
Contract, which can include setting out the 
structural reforms that it seeks to undertake. 
Subsequently, the Commission assesses the 
proposed reforms. If the amendments 
proposed by the Member State are thought 
to be insufficient after a first warning, the 
country risks having its cohesion policy 
funding suspended as a sanction. 
For countries that are under a European 
bailout, macroeconomic conditionality does 
not only entail a possible sanction: in such 
cases, macroeconomic conditionality can also 
provide a positive financial incentive to the 
Member State. This “carrot” takes the form of 
increasing the European co-financing of 
cohesion policy projects in the Member State. 
As a consequence, the required additional 
national funding for these projects is 
reduced. Such higher European co-financing 
would, crucially, allow the fiscally troubled 
Member State to continue to invest in its 
economy (Verhelst, 2012). 
While this was not necessarily the intention at 
its inception, macroeconomic conditionality 
could be applied in both a binding and a non-
binding manner. It would be binding when 
the Commission states at the start of the 
procedure that a sanction can be applied in 
case of inadequate reform proposals by the 
Member State. Alternatively, macroeconomic 
conditionality could remain non-binding 
when the Commission invites the Member 
State to propose amendments to its 
Partnership Contract, while indicating that it 
does not foresee applying a sanction at that 
stage.6 
MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY 
AS A FULL-FLEDGED SUBSTITUTE FOR 
STRUCTURAL REFORM CONTRACTS 
A popular English expression states that “if it 
looks like a duck, swims like a duck and quacks 
like a duck ... then it probably is a duck”. To a 
large extent, the expression can be applied to 
macroeconomic conditionality and structural 
reform contracts. As they both involve a 
document of a contractual nature detailing 
structural reforms, drawn up by the EU and 
the Member States, it would be difficult to 
keep the two apart. However, for 
macroeconomic conditionality to be a full-
fledged substitute for structural reform 
contracts, it would need to undergo two 
small, but beneficial, changes. 
Firstly, the use of its financial incentive 
should be expanded. The financial incentive 
currently foreseen in macroeconomic 
conditionality is only available to countries 
that receive a European bailout (see supra). It 
would be a rather easy step to widen the use 
of this financial incentive so that it also 
covers structural reforms (or even all types of 
macroeconomic conditionality).7 While such 
an incentive is less far-reaching than an 
entirely new budget, it would be a useful and 
– crucially – less expensive alternative. If a 
new budget nonetheless proves to be 
feasible, it could easily be integrated into the 
framework of macroeconomic conditionality. 
As a second beneficial change, the rules on 
macroeconomic conditionality should allow 
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for sufficient involvement of national and 
European parliaments. This seems essential 
to ensure the ownership of the instrument, 
and would take into account the ongoing 
concerns about legitimacy and accountability 
of the European Economic Union.  
CONCLUSION 
In theory, contractual arrangements for 
structural reform are a good idea. In practice, 
however, they risk rendering European 
economic governance even more complex 
and cumbersome. This would have 
counterproductive consequences for the 
overall effectiveness of the European 
economic governance framework. 
Given the disadvantages of creating a 
completely new instrument, the EU should 
look at how it can make better use of the 
instruments already at its disposal. 
Macroeconomic conditionality, serving as a 
bridge between cohesion policy and 
economic governance, offers such an 
alternative. It provides the EU with the 
option of requiring a Member State to detail 
its structural reform plans in a document of a 
contractual nature. 
To ensure that macroeconomic conditionality 
becomes a full substitute for structural 
reform contracts, it would need to undergo 
two minor adjustments. Firstly, the use of its 
financial incentive should be expanded to 
provide a less expensive alternative to 
creating an entirely new budget. Secondly, 
macroeconomic conditionality should allow 
for parliamentary involvement, so as to meet 
concerns about the EU’s legitimacy.  
In sum, using macroeconomic conditionality 
as an alternative for structural reform 
contracts avoids needlessly duplicating 
procedures. This prevents a further increase 
in complexity. In addition, it would allow the 
EU to overcome key problems linked to the 
creation of structural reform contracts, while 
at the same time benefiting from their 
potential advantages. 
Stijn Verhelst is Senior Research Fellow at 
Egmont – Royal Institute for International 
Relations. 
The author thanks the various colleagues 
who commented on an earlier draft of this 
brief for their valuable input. 
ENDNOTES 
1 The mandatory nature of such a contract would most likely be linked to a specific stage in the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure (see Regulation No 1176/2011). 
2 Given its limited size, the fund should be well-targeted. Using the fund for many reforms (and thus in many 
countries), would reduce its effectiveness. 
3 The European Council has approved it by unanimity in its multi-annual budget agreement, while the European 
Parliament is not in favour of macroeconomic conditionality, (European Parliament, 2012; European Council, 
2013). Given the support from the Member States, it seems likely that macroeconomic conditionality will be 
introduced. 
4 Which boils down to insufficient consideration for the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment 
guidelines on which the country-specific recommendations are based (Article 21(1)a of Commission Proposal 
COM(2011) 615 final/2). 
5 The Partnership Contract should notably include the national arrangements “to ensure alignment with [...] the targets 
set in the country-specific recommendations” (Article 14 of COM(2011)615 final/2). 
6 Such an application of macroeconomic conditionality would correspond to the non-binding invitation by the 
Commission to sign structural reform contracts. 
7 This would be achieved by expanding the conditions mentioned in Article 22(1) of Commission Proposal 
COM(2011) 615 final/2. 
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